because participation in associations that engaged in public activities was considered strong, the literature tended to downplay the role of more conservative private associations. I analyze here the recent change in the pattern of mobilization in Brazil and show that said change is strongly tied to changes in the pattern of association. Until 2013, Brazil diverted from the North American pattern of association, a pattern that shows a clear hegemony of middle-class actors at different venues for participation (Verba et al., 1995) . Only after this change have we seen a "normalization" of the pattern of participation in the country. In the paper, I will first explain this process of change in pattern of association and later try to analyze the effect of these changes on the June 2013 demonstration. These demonstrations still demand an explanation. I will show that there are two available explanations for the June 2013 demonstrations: an external line of explanation based on the willingness of members of charities, clubs, and professional associations to go public; a second explanation points to the inability of the movement that initially called the demonstrations the Free Pass Movement (MPL) to politicize it. I will synthesize these two explanations in order to provide a broader one that takes into account changes in pattern of association and collective action.
Institutional participation as a repertoire of collective action
Brazil has experienced changes over the last 30 years that have significantly altered the political and social organization of the country. First, democracy was reestablished in 1985 and the Constitution followed in 1988. The Constitution introduced two important changes for Brazil: the first concerns the system of political representation. The post-1988 system of political representation in Brazil maintains the wide prerogatives of the President and incorporates them into a system of inter-party negotiations within the National Congress. Discipline, in terms of political support for the President, is achieved through a system of institutionalization of give-and-take politics.
Although this system has a high rate of success of presidential initiatives-close to that of the British parliamentary system (Limongi, 2006, p. 6 )-most of the resources involved in MP's amendments or political indications are spent irrationally and have led to corruption among the governing coalition (Ames, 2002, p. 22-23) . In this sense, the system of representation has experienced both innovation and fragmentation, simultaneously allowing governance in terms of the approval of executive branch proposals in Congress and generating un-governability in terms of the wide rejection of these practices by public opinion that has increased dramatically since 2013.
The second change to follow the Constitution was a dramatic increase in participation. Due to regulations outlined within the Constitution, during the 1990s, more than 10,000 local councils were created in Brazil spanning the areas of health, social assistance, and urban planning. Outlined within the Constitution chapter regarding social assistance were the Lei Orgânica da Saúde (LOS), Lei Orgânica da Assistência Social (LOAS), and the Statute of the City of 2000. The focus of these regulations is to introduce new participatory mechanisms and participatory institutions at both the local and national level. These councils are hybrid participatory formats in which civil society associations elect, or otherwise, choose members of their constituencies to participate. In policy councils, civil society actors share decision-making with state actors within a common decision-making framework. Today in Brazil, there are close to 5,000 health councils, 5,000 social assistance councils, and 1,000 participatory city master plans (Avritzer, 2009, p. 116) .
Social participation in Brazil after 1988 is both an institutional policy and a repertoire of collective action. As an institutional policy, it incorporates social actors in decision-making processes in areas as important as health and social protection. As a repertoire of collective action, institutional participation integrates into decision-making processes new actors who join neighborhood associations and associations linked to health issues or to education, among others (Avritzer, 2002; Baiocchi, 2005; Wampler, 2007; Avritzer, 2009; Wampler, 2015) . This has generated a long process of inclusion and reduction of inequalities in Brazil, changing a previous pattern of exclusion of the poor by the political system that prevailed until 1985.
The inauguration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as president of Brazil in January
2003 is a second moment that greatly influenced the nature of social participation in the country. Brazil has two main institutions that help the president in his/her relation with the political system. The first, "Casa Civil," is the equivalent to the chief of staff, and the second, is the general secretary of the presidency that until 2002 had attributions linked to the specific needs of MPs (most of them linked to pork politics). During Lula's first day in office, he altered the role of the general secretary by assigning to the secretary the duty of coordinating relations with civil society actors (Brazil, law decree 4570) . In addition, many new national councils were introduced in areas of both social and public policy. In fact, the number of national councils increased from 15 to 31 councils during Lula's first term in office.
More significantly, however, it was through national conferences that social participation acquired a new role in the federal government in Brazil. National conferences are large public meetings between state and civil society representatives that make proposals for the implementation of specific public policies. National conferences have taken place in Brazil since the 40s when President Getúlio Vargas carried out the first national conference on health. Between 2003 and 2010, the federal government organized 74 national conferences. Twenty-three new conferences were organized between 2011 and 2012. These conferences played the role of connecting civil society with the government, offsetting the lack of legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of civil society. Again, it is possible to argue that, just as at the local level, changes in the pattern of collective action impact the state and democracy at the national level. New venues for social inclusion were opened at the state level with the participation of social actors. This drive has generated a decrease in inequality.
Since 2013, Brazil has been experiencing changes in both levels of participation and levels of representation. As regards representation, the strengthening of conservative forces in Congress is taking place because of a huge increase in private financing. According to the data of the Movimento Nacional de Combate a Corrupção Eleitoral, among the 500 best financed campaigns in Brazil, more than 300 have been successful in electing MPs. Money has become the decisive factor in the composition of the National Congress, moving it to assume a conservative stance. Additionally, other factors have contributed to this rightward shift: (1) the reaction against the legalization of civil rights for the gay population; (2) being against the stabilization of public finances; and, last but not least, (3) strongly reacting against the increase in participation at the federal level embodied in decree 8243. Thus, in spite of an important increase in participation at the federal level, there is a strong reaction against participation at the law-making level. We are also seeing that participation alone cannot change the composition of the system of representation.
The events occurring in Brazil in June of 2013-events that changed the pattern of social participation-have called the world's attention. At the time, the infrastructure works for the World Cup and concerns over public transportation were high on the agenda. Members of left-wing sectors were dissatisfied with Dilma's government and their approach to urban politics (Maricato, 2013) , which consequently catalyzed strong right-wing dissatisfaction with the government. When we look at the demonstrations taking place and the participants, it was mainly young people pushing the agenda (43% were between 14 and 24 years old). These youths can be further characterized by their high levels of education (91% were in college or had finished college) and high incomes (23% had family incomes equivalent to more than ten minimum wages) (Avritzer, 2015) . (Baiocchi, 2005) . The socio-economic profile of the participants does not dictate people's participation. Members of both local and national participatory experiences shared many profile elements, such as income (between 1 to 5 minimum wages) and average years of education (8 years) (see Table 2 ). Thus, the pattern of social participation in Brazil from 1985 to 2013 can be established: re-enforced selected civil associations with strong political links with institutional participation. In terms of its social configuration, a pattern is also observed: participants' incomes are very close to the Brazilian average and levels of education are slightly higher. for its electoral victory (Avritzer, 2015) . In March 2015, less than 90 days after the inauguration, middle-class protesters were back on the streets, but with a change in grievance. The main claim was the impeachment of the President.
A survey 6 applied among the protesters in Belo Horizonte, Brasília, and São Paulo inquired into the social characteristics of the protesters. As regards income and education, the results showed that 46% of the protesters in Belo Horizonte had income above 10 minimum wages. In Brasília the average income is even higher (49%), and in both cities more than 80% of protestors had a college education (Avritzer, 2015) . The highest income profile was found in São Paulo where 52% of demonstrators had an average income above 10 minimum wages. However, the most interesting findings concern the pattern of participation of the protesters. The survey showed a history of previous participation in both participatory budgeting and neighborhood associations similar to that of participatory groups researched on PB. (Wampler & Avritzer, 2004 Last but not least, there seems to be a difference between the demonstrators in Belo Horizonte and Brasília. Brasília shows the pattern of participation of a city without strong forms of institutionalized participation, whereas Belo Horizonte bridges both institutional and non-institutional participation. It is difficult to say at this point what the national standard is, but such information may emerge from a survey we conducted this past August in São Paulo.
Understanding the change in the pattern of participation in Brazil
Brazil's pattern of participation diverted from that of many other countries between 1985 and 2013. It is well known that the pattern of participation in the United
States and countries such as Italy is dominated by the middle-class (Verba, 1995; Putnam, 1993 Putnam, , 2000 . This pattern does not lead to direct political participation, but it has a political impact and allows conservative sectors to enhance their political influence.
For example, the uneven financing of public education in the United States expresses middle-class activism in the country as well as the financing of culture. On the other hand, the sub-financing of inner cities is also related to the low brokerage power of popular sectors in the United States. Brazil has diverted from this pattern of participation both because it has had a long cycle of participation centered on poor social actors because the public belonged to a certain type of public/political association. Thus, the analysis presented here is different from the data presented by Ribeiro and Borba (2015) ; it focuses on different types of associations as having different political consequences (Krishna, 2000) .
In contrast, between 1985 and 2013, Brazil developed a pattern of participation that concentrated on generating participation among the poor through avenues like participatory budgeting and national conferences. In both of these cases, there is both a repertoire of contention and a pattern of participation that involves those with income between one and five minimum wages with up to eight years of education. This participation contrasts with the pattern of participation extant in the Northern democracies, not only due to its participants, but also due to its relations with the political system. Participation in Brazil after 1990 meant institutional participation, and it helped establish a participatory project (Dagnino et al., 2008) through which the government initiated participation and social actors joined the process, thus strengthening participation as a whole. As a result of this process, Brazil sees a boost in the distributive social policies sponsored by the state both at the local and federal levels of government, as shown in Figure 3 . Social participation, in the form described in section one, was naturalized in Brazil until 2013, in the sense that much of the literature assumed that participation in the country would sustain these characteristics, namely that of a booster of state and popular civil society (Avritzer, 2009; Lavalle, 2011; Tatagiba, 2015; ) . It was assumed It is impossible to forecast if there will be a stage III-that will more likely be a consequence of strong polarization with both the progressive and the conservative side mobilizing. What is possible to say is that the anchorage that social participation afforded the PT's governments is over, and right now the movements on the streets are only making the government more unstable. However, it is likely we are arriving at some closure related to the specific configuration of social participation that emerged from the "new republic", not only in the area of participation, but also at the level of representation. What will emerge in its place? It is too soon to tell. The only conclusion reached, thus far, is that a form of social participation such as the one Brazil has known after 1985 is more the international exception than the rule. Now Brazil is having a normalization of participation that shows that it can play both a stabilizing and a destabilizing role. The specific configuration that made the Brazilian case a successful participatory case may now be over. 
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Participation in democratic Brazil: from popular hegemony and innovation to middle-class protest
Brazil became a reference case of social participation after the success of participatory budgeting during the early 90s. The standard theory of the success of participation points to its positive impact on the political system. However, since 2013 Brazil has been experiencing some important changes regarding both participation and representation. In regard to representation, the strengthening of conservative forces in Congress is taking place because of a large increase in private financing. We are also seeing that participation alone cannot change the composition of the system of representation. The events that occurred in Brazil in June 2013, which led to changes in the patterns of social participation, have attracted attention worldwide. The aim of this paper is to analyze these changes in Brazil and point out how they influenced the country's political system and impacted the organization of Brazilian democracy. The data show how MPL presented its demands without politicizing them, keeping itself a single-issue movement (Figure 1 ). They also show how MBL politicized the movement (Figure 2 ), transforming it into an anti-corruption movement positioned against president Dilma Rousseff. Brasil se ha convertido en una referencia en lo que respecta a la participación social luego del éxito del presupuesto participativo en los inicios de los años noventa. La teoría más difundida sobre el éxito de la participación destaca su impacto positivo en el sistema político. Sin embargo, Brasil ha experimentado algunos cambios importantes tanto en el nivel de la participación como en el de la representación desde 2013. Por un lado, con respecto a la representación, ha tenido lugar un fortalecimiento de fuerzas conservadoras en el Congreso, debido a un enorme aumento del financiamiento privado. Se observa también que la participación no puede por sí sola transformar la composición del sistema de representación. Por otro lado, Brasil ha atraído la atención del mundo entero por los acontecimientos ocurridos en junio de 2013, que produjeron cambios en los patrones de participación social. El propósito de este artículo es analizar ambos cambios en Brasil y mostrar cómo los mismos han influido en el sistema político del país e impactado en la organización de la democracia brasileña. Los datos muestran como el MPL presentó sus demandas sin politizarlas (Figura 1) y como el MBL politizó las demandas hechas en junio del 2013 (Figura 2) transformándolas en un movimiento contra la corrupción y contra la presidente Dilma Rousseff.
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Résumé
Participation à la démocratie brésilienne: l'hégémonie populaire et l'innovation de la protestation de la classe moyenne Le Brésil est devenu une référence dans la participation sociale après le succès du budget participatif pendant le début des années 1990. La théorie traditionnelle sur le succès de la participation indique son effet positif sur le système politique. Cependant, le Brésil a connu quelques changements importants soit au niveau de la participation, soit au niveau de la représentation dès 2013. En ce qui concerne la représentation, le renforcement des forces conservatrices au Congrès se déroule en raison d'une augmentation considérable des financements privés. On constate également que la participation seule ne peut pas changer la composition du système de représentation. Le Brésil a attiré l'attention du monde entier à la suite des événements survenus en juin 2013, qui ont entraîné des changements dans les schémas de participation sociale. L'objectif de cet article est d'analyser ces deux changements au Brésil et d'indiquer comment ils ont influencé le système politique du pays et ont affecté l'organisation de la démocratie brésilienne. Les données montrent de quelle façon le MPL a présenté ses demandes sans les politiser (Figure 1 ) et comment le MBL a politisé les demandes faites en juin 2013 (Figure 2 ) organisant alors un mouvement contre la corruption et contre la présidente Dilma Rousseff.
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